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ABSTRACT
An empirical analysis is conducted on the pro-cyclicality of SME loans based on purpose, 
which has not been examined in previous research. In this study, the purpose of SME loans 
is divided into four types: total SME loans, long-term loans for investment in equipment, 
long-term loans for R&D investment, and short-term loans for working capital. The aim 
of the study is to determine whether pro-cyclicality exists in the four types of loans. In 
particular, it is expected that because of the high-risk weight considered in estimating 
credit risk, the number of long-term loans may have decreased in the economic distress 
experienced since 2006, when the Basel II accord came into effect. At that time, most banks 
adopted the advanced internal rating approach to calculate borrowers' credit risks. This 
study is based on the assumption that the risk weight of long-term loans is different from 
that of short-term loans. The GMM model is adopted to test the pro-cyclicality of long-term 
and short-term loans. The test results showed significant pro-cyclicality in long-term loans 
for investment in equipment and R&D. Second, there was no pro-cyclicality in short-term 
loans for purchasing raw materials. Third, the financial characteristics affecting the lending 
behaviour of banks were indicators of profitability and financial soundness of credit. Based 
on the results, effective policies are recommended, such as credit enhancement through 
credit guarantees, in order to alleviate the effects of pro-cyclicality on long-term loans.
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INTRODUCTION
In the banking sector, pro-cyclicality is defined as variations in the granting of 
credit according to variations in the real business cycle. Thus, the phenomenon 
of granting credit is increased or decreased when the business cycle is expanded 
or depressed, respectively. Bernanke and Gertler (1990) showed that information 
asymmetry between borrowers and lenders leads to pro-cyclicality. In particular, 
small- and medium-sized loans, such as SME loans, have information asymmetry 
because little information is available to judge the credit condition of an SME. 
From the bank's perspective, a high credit risk indicates the probability of default 
on the loan. Craig, Davis, and Pascual (2006) and Seo (2013) found evidence of 
pro-cyclicality in SME loans. Craig et al. (2006) pointed out that excessive pro-
cyclicality was the main reason for financial crises. 
In response to the financial crisis of 2008–2009, a new capital regulation 
called Basel III has come into effect. Basel III includes the steps required for the 
regulation of capital buffers and of loan-to-deposit ratios to alleviate the effects 
of pro-cyclicality. In particular, the regulation of capital buffers to alleviate pro-
cyclicality requires banks to secure capital in addition to the minimum amount of 
capital against future financial crisis, as suggested by the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS). According to the regulation of capital buffers, until 2019, Korean 
banks are supposed to secure additional capital that is 2.5% of the capital buffer. 
The loan-to-deposit ratio regulation has been in effect as the macro-prudential 
regulation by the Korean financial authority for the management and evaluation 
of Korean banks since November 2008. This regulation requires that the range of 
average loan balances is restricted to 100% of the average deposit balance in order 
to sharply reduce the number of SME loans during the economic depression. 
However, despite Basel III, Korean banks have a high sensitivity to credit 
risk because they tend to retrieve SME loans quickly when the risk management 
strategy detects signs of default. The banks' risk aversion behaviour is based on 
their adoption of the advanced internal rating approach, which occurred after the 
regulations of Basel II were implemented in 2006. The advanced internal rating 
suggested by Basel II regulates banks to estimate expected losses by multiplying 
exposure at default by probability of default and the 1-recovery ratio. Thus, banks 
encounter big differences between the expected losses of long-term loans and 
short-term loans even though borrowers have the same credit rating; the only 
difference is the extent of the loan period. Hence, compared with short-term loans, 
the expected losses on long-term loans will be higher than on short-term loans 
because of the higher balances and lower recovery ratios of long-term loans. 
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Under Basel III, the regime of advanced internal rating in credit risk 
management is still effective. Accordingly, in order to alleviate pro-cyclicality, 
Korean banks may manage credit risk using risk-aversion because of the internal 
rating scheme initiated by Basel II despite new regulations, such as the capital 
buffer and the loan-to-deposit ratio. In the light of the feature of credit risk 
management within Korean banks, it assumed that a difference exists between the 
pro-cyclicality pattern of long-term loans and short-term loans in the Korean SME 
loan market. Thus, the lending behaviour of Korean banks differs according to the 
loan period. 
The current study analyses the pro-cyclicality of SME loans according 
to the purpose of the loan. Most SMEs raises funds to invest in equipment and 
research and development (R&D) on the long-term basis. Generally, short-
term loans are used to pay salaries, and are used for working capital. Banks 
also established internal regulations to increase the flexibility of SME loans by 
restricting the maximum loan period depending on the usage of the loan. Loans for 
working capital and R&D are one year and up to ten years, respectively. Based on 
the internal regulation of Korean banks, the current study classifies loans into four 
categories: (1) total loan (SME); (2) loans for working capital used to purchase raw 
materials (WorkM); (3) loans for equipment investment (InvE); and (4) loans for 
R&D (InvRD). These categories are used to analyse lending behaviour in business 
cycles under the Basel regulations. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Basel II, the new Basel accord, provides guidelines that banks must use to estimate 
minimum requirement capital by subdividing the credit ratings of borrowers, which 
were used before the implementation of the accord. Since 2006, most Korean banks 
estimate risk weights by using the loan balance upon bankruptcy, expected default 
rate, and loss in default. It is assumed that this advanced internal rating approach 
increased risk sensitivity because long-term loans are more disadvantageous in 
estimating risk weight than short-term loans are. Thus, the implementation of 
Basel II leads to intensifying the risk aversion to SME loans in Korean banks 
depending on business cycles. 
However, risk-aversive lending behaviour by Korean banks may exacerbate 
the pro-cyclicality of loans. The pro-cyclicality of SME loans may be distinctive, 
depending on the loan period (Borio, Furfine, & Lowe, 2001; Sala & Saurina, 2002; 
Lowe, 2002; Bliss & Kaufman, 2002; Catarineu-Rabell, Jackson, & Tsomocos, 
2003; Pain, 2003; Kashyap & Stein, 2004; Estrella, 2004; Lindquist, 2004; 
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Allen & Saunders, 2004; Berger & Udell, 2004; Jimenez & Saurina, 2006; Craig et 
al., 2006; Seo, 2011). Previous empirical studies found that adherence to the new 
Basel accord intensified the pro-cyclicality of SME loans. In their panel regression 
of 300 banks in 11 Asian countries, Craig et al. (2006) found evidence that the 
pro-cyclicality of SME loans had been exacerbated by the new Basel accord. In 
a recent study using Korean data from 1999 to 2008, Seo (2013) showed that the 
pro-cyclicality of SME loans increased, but there was no pro-cyclicality in large 
enterprise loans. Previous research examined the effects of lending behaviour on 
pro-cyclicality by classifying enterprise loans into SME loans and large enterprise 
loans. 
Based on their research, Cavallo and Majnoni (2001), Segaviano and 
Lowe (2002), and Seo (2012) recommended that the provision system should be 
changed to alleviate the pro-cyclicality of bank loans. In particular, Seo (2012) 
suggested a forward-looking provision system, in which banks would reserve 
sufficient provisions on bad debt based on the expected loss when the economy 
expanded. Seo (2012) also showed evidence that the forward-looking provision 
system contributes to alleviating the pro-cyclicality of SME loans that have high 
credit risk and information asymmetry. This evidence implies that banks without 
sufficient provisions based on expected losses would show risk-aversive lending 
behaviour in response to the high-risk sensitivity of SME loans. 
Craig et al. (2006) and Seo (2013) recommended the estimation method 
for pro-cyclicality by testing the significance of coefficient of loan change rates to 
gross domestic product growth rates. Based on a review of the relevant literature, 
Seo (2013) also pointed out that banks' financial characteristics affect the lending 
behaviour of Korean banks, including capital adequacy, financial soundness, and 
profitability. Berrospide and Edge (2010) argued that capital adequacy, such as the 
BIS, ratio plays a pivotal role in alleviating the uncertainty of bank loans. Ryu and 
Park (2010) supported the findings of Berrospide and Edge (2010). Aggarwal and 
Jacques (2001) insisted that financial soundness, such as the non-performing loan 
ratio, affects loan changes because it is an influential factor in estimating credit 
risk. In addition, Stolz and Wedow (2011) argued that the profitability of banks 
affects the minimum required capital and the level of capital buffer. 
Previous theoretical studies on the pro-cyclicality of SME loans found that 
it has increased since the implementation of the new Basel accord. However, after 
the announcement of Basel III, few studies have examined the pro-cyclicality of 
SME loans depending on the purpose of the funds. Accordingly, the current study 
conducts an analysis to determine whether the purpose of the funds has affected 
pro-cyclicality of SME loans use since the adoption of Basel III. 
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DATA AND MODEL
Data
The current study used raw data on bank loans, the macro economy, and financial 
market in Korea in order to determine whether the pro-cyclicality of SME loans 
is affected by the purpose of the funds. The data were collected the Statistics 
Database of Small and Medium Business Administration, the Economic Statistics 
System of the Bank of Korea, and the Financial Statistics Information System of 
the Financial Supervisory Service. Raw data on bank loans to SMEs executed 
by 15 banks were collected for the period 2006, when the new Basel accord was 
implemented, to 2014. The data analysis focuses on the subdivisions of borrowers' 
credit ratings.
The dependent, independent, and control variables are presented in Table 1. 
As the table shows, the dependent variables are Total SME loans, loans for 
working capital used to purchase raw materials, loans for equipment, and loans 
for R&D. Each dependent variable represents the loan change according to the 
purpose of the loan in terms of SMEs. Natural logarithms are used to calculate the 
differential variables in the loan data. The independent variables of GDP rate, BIS 
ratio, net interest margin (NIM), and non-performing loan ratio (NPL) are included 
in the empirical test model. The market rate and default rate are used as control 
variables, and the business survey index is applied as an instrumental variable in 
the generalised method of moment (GMM).
Table 1
Definitions of variables
Variables Definition Contents
∆SMEi,t Differentials of 
total SME loan
Dependent variable representing the change in total small and 
medium enterprise bank loan i with time t. It is calculated 
through adding natural logarithm to transform the variable into 
differentiated standardisation for data analysis as follows:
∆SMEi,t = ln(SMEi,t) – ln(SMEi,t–1)
∆WorkMi,t Differentials of 
SME loan for 
raw materials
Dependent variable representing the change in small and 
medium enterprise bank loan i with time t for raw materials 
as working capital. It is calculated through adding natural 
logarithm to make the variable transformed into differentiated 
standardisation style for data analysis as follows.
∆WorkMi,t = ln(WorkMi,t) – ln(WorkMi,t–1)
(continued on next page)
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Variables Definition Contents
∆InvEi,t Differentials of 
SME loan for 
investment in 
equipment
Dependent variable representing the change in small and 
medium enterprise bank loan i with time t for investment in 
equipment. It is calculated through adding natural logarithm 
to make the variable transformed into standardisation style for 
data analysis as follows.
∆InvEi,t = ln(InvEi,t) – ln(InvEi,t–1)
∆InvRDi,t Differentials 
of SME loan 
for R&D 
investment 
Dependent variable representing the change in small and 
medium enterprise bank loan i with time t for investment in 
research and development. It is calculated through adding 
natural logarithm to make the variable transformed into 
differentiated standardisation style for data analysis as follows.
∆InvRDi,t = ln(InvRDi,t) – ln(InvRDi,t–1)
BizCyclet Business 
cycle for an 
independent 
variable
Proxy variable representing the business cycle or economic 
condition. It is calculated as the 1st differential of ln(GDPt) 
removing seasonality. The proxy variable is adopted from 
Craig et al. (2006) and Seo (2013).
BISi,t Capital 
adequacy ratio 
of bank
Proxy variable for the capital adequacy ratio based on Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) rule in bank i with time t. The 
calculation method is as follows:
BISi,t = Capital(tier1 + tier2)i,t ÷ Risk – weighted_Asseti,t × 100
NIMi,t Net interest 
margin of bank
Proxy variable for the net interest margin as the main source of 
profitability in bank i with time t. The calculation method is as 
follows:
NIMi,t = (Interest_Income – Interest_Paid)i,t ÷  
Interest_Bearing_Asseti,t × 100
NPLi,t Non-performing 
loan of bank
Proxy variable for financial soundness of bank i with time t. 
The proxy variable is adopted from Lee and Seo (2013). The 
calculation of the ratio is as follows:
NPLi,t = Bad_Debtsi,t ÷ Total_Loansi,t × 100
Control(M)t The level of 
market rate
Level of market rate, i.e. call rate, is as a control variable.
Control(R)t The level of 
default
Default rate in the country is a control variable.
Gindex An instrumental 
variable
First differential of ln(Business_Cycle_Index) removing 
seasonality as an instrumental variable used in the generalised 
method of moment. 
Crisis_Dumt Dummy 
variable for 
financial crisis
Dummy variable for the global financial crisis from 2008 to 
2009. The value is 1 or 0 if the financial crisis period is applied.
Table 1: (continued)
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Model
The current study uses panel GMM methodology as expressed in Equations (1) 
and (2). Panel data, not time series data, are analysed because the bigger sample 
size of panel data, compared to time series data, increases the degree of freedom to 
contribute to raising the efficiency of estimation (Frees, 2004). Panel data analysis 
also mitigates potential problems in multicollinearity and estimation bias caused 
by omitted variables. 
Moreover, GMM methodology is the most reliable estimation method 
because it does not required the distribution of residual terms. GMM methodology 
requires an instrumental variable (Zi) and the orthogonality condition, E[μi,t Zi] = 0. 
The current study adopts the differentials of the business survey index as the 
instrumental variable. The appropriateness of the instrumental variable is proved 
by using the Sargan test, which is related to over-identification restrictions, as 
suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). The test results confirmed that there was 
no bias in using the selected instrumental variable if the null hypothesis is that no 
correlation exists between the instrumental variables, and the residual term cannot 
be rejected statistically. 
Equations (1) and (2) were designed for empirical testing. Equation (1) 
was used to test the pro-cyclicality of total SME loans or short-term SME loans 
for working capital, such as raw materials. Equation (2) was used is to determine 
whether pro-cyclicality existed in long-term SME loans, such as bank loan for 
investment in equipment or R&D. The results of Equations (1) and (2) are shown 
in Table 4 and Table 5.
∆SMEi,t (∆WorkSi,t) = 0 + 1 BizCyclet + 2 BISi,t + 3 NIMi,t + 
4 NPLi,t + Control(M)t + Control(R)t + 
Zi,t + υt + ui,t
(1)
∆InvEi,t (∆InvRDi,t) = 0 + 1 BizCyclet + 2 BISi,t + 3 NIMi,t + 
4 NPLi,t + Control(M)t + Control(R)t + 
Zi,t + υt + ui,t
(2)
where:
i, t and vt refers the numbers of cross-sectional data, time series data, and time effect 
to consider the time series effect of dependent variables in GMM methodology, 
respectively.
Control(M)t and Control(R)t mean the control variable for levels of market rate and 
default rate, respectively.
Zi,t means an instrumental variable.
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RESULTS
Basic Statistics
Table 2 shows the basic statistics of the variables used in the study. No variable 
except for BIS was normally distributed because all Jarque-Bera statistics were 
significant. The mean of the change rate of total SME loans was 5.00% in a positive 
direction. However, the change rate of short-term loans had an average value of 
−2.67%, which was a negative value. In the case of long-term loans, the average 
change rates of SME loans for investment in equipment and R&D were −43.54% 
and 17.73%, respectively. 
The mean GDP rate representing the business cycle was 0.8571%. The 
bank characteristics of capital adequacy ratio, net interest margin, and non-
performing loan ratio had means of 13.88%, 2.45%, and 1.27%, respectively. 
Table 2
Descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean Median Standard deviation
Minimum 
value
Maximum 
value
Jarque-Bera 
Statistic
ΔSME 0.0500 0.0538 0.0803 -0.1658 0.3248 6.0200**
ΔWorkM -0.0267 0.1441 0.3867 -1.0430 0.4383 51.5504***
ΔInvE -0.4354 0.0292 1.2147 -3.4913 0.5426 82.1622***
ΔInvRD 0.1773 0.2768 0.4655 -0.6210 0.8486 8.2912**
BizCyclet  (%) 0.8571 0.8500 0.6123 -0.3500 1.5750 9.7796***
BIS (%) 13.8831 13.8200 1.6408 10.7100 18.0500 1.6275
NIM (%) 2.4496 2.5200 0.5850 0.2000 3.4800 31.6329***
NPL (%) 1.2704 1.1800 0.4829 0.3600 3.3400 196.2540***
Control(M) (%) 3.2064 3.0750 1.0700 4.7825 1.9850 11.8577***
Control(R) (%) 0.1726 0.1425 0.0922 0.1092 0.3883 61.0120***
Note: ** and  *** means statistically significant at 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Table 3 shows the result of Pairwise correlation analysis, and especially 
there is the positive significance between business cycle and the change rates of 
SME loans for R&D.
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Table 3
Pairwise correlations analysis
Variables ΔSME ΔWorkM ΔInvE ΔInvRD BizCycle
ΔSME 1.0000
ΔWorkM -0.0291
(p < 0.7685)
1.0000
ΔInvE -0.0612
(p < 0.5353)
0.9129
(p < 0.0000)
1.0000
ΔInvRD 0.2037
(p < 0.0371)
-0.5515
(p < 0.0000)
-0.5262
(p < 0.0000)
1.0000
BizCycle 0.0937
(p < 0.3420)
-0.1387
(0.1581)
0.0333
(p < 0.7359)
0.6022
(p < 0.0000)
1.0000
Note: Parentheses () mean the p-value. 
Test Results
Table 4 presents the results of testing the existence of pro-cyclicality in total SME 
loans and short-term loans in relation to the business cycle. Model 1 and Model 2 
indicate the test results using the changes in total SME loans and short-term SME 
loans as the dependent variables. Model 1 shows that pro-cyclicality existed in 
total SME loans depending on the business cycle, regardless of the inclusion of 
the dummy variable for the financial crisis stage: the estimated coefficients were 
0.1141 and 0.1702 at 5% significance. However, no pro-cyclicality was found in 
the relation of short-term SME loans to the business cycle in Model 2: the estimated 
coefficients were insignificant at −0.1073 and −0.3532. Regarding short-term SME 
loans for purchasing raw materials the results showed that the pro-cyclicality of 
SME loans in relation to the business cycle had been mitigated since 2006 when 
the new Basel accord was implemented. 
The bank characteristics of profitability and financial soundness were 
related to the change in short-term SME loans: the coefficients of NIM in and NPL 
were 0.0826 and −0.0488, respectively. However, no significance was found in the 
relationship between bank characteristics and loan change in Model 1 regardless 
of specification. 
The Sargan test for robustness (Arellano & Bond, 1991) indicated that the 
selected instrumental variables were appropriate because the null hypothesis was 
not rejected. Furthermore, no z-statistic rejected the null hypotheses that there is no 
correlation in the residual term. 
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Table 4
Analytical results of effects of pro-cyclicality on total loans and short-term loans
Model 1
(Dependent Variable=ΔSMEi,t )
Model 2
(Dependent Variable = ΔWorkMi,t )
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4
Intercept 0.2028
(1.01)
-0.6829
(-1.52)
-0.8926***
(-14.63)
-0.5043***
(-3.17)
(1) BizCyclet 0.1141**
(2.14)
0.1702**
(2.45)
-0.1073
(-0.46)
-0.3532
(-1.20)
(2) BISi,t -0.0078
(-0.79)
-0.0078
(-0.79)
-0.0018
(-0.21)
-0.0018
(-0.21)
(3) NIMi,t 0.0674
(1.48)
0.0674
(1.48)
0.0826**
(2.33)
0.0826**
(2.33)
(4) NPLi,t 0.0088
(0.70)
0.0088
(0.70)
-0.0488***
(-2.87)
-0.0488***
(-2.87)
(5) Control(M)t Included Included Included Included
(6) Control(R)t Included Included Included Included
(7) Crisis_Dumt Excluded Included Excluded Included
Time_effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm_effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sargan_Test (χ2) 4.63 4.63 3.98 3.98
Notes: ** and *** means statistically significant at 5% and 1%, respectively. The hypothesis of the Sargan test 
is that there is no correlation between the instrument variable and the residual term, and it cannot be rejected. 
The hypothesis of the Z test that there is no autocorrelation in the residual term, and it cannot be rejected.
Table 5 shows the results for the existence of pro-cyclicality of long-
term SME loans according to the business. In Model 3 and Model 4, these results 
imply that long-term loans are pro-cyclical in relation to economic conditions. The 
estimated coefficients of the business cycle were significant at 1% regardless of 
the specification. Thus, the positive values of 0.4518, 0.6297, 0.3350, and 0.3391 
imply that changes in long-term SME loans correspond to economic conditions 
in the same direction, which is called pro-cyclicality. Contrary to the changes in 
short-term loans, the results showed that SME loans for investment in equipment 
and R&D were affected by economic conditions, which was expected. Based on 
this result, it can be inferred that the existence of the pro-cyclicality of long-term 
loans is attributed to the high sensitivity of credit risk since the new Basel accord 
was implemented.
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The bank characteristics of net interest margin and non-performing loan 
ratio were significantly correlated with changes in long-term loans. The coefficients 
were 0.0826 and -0.0488, respectively, in Model 3 and Model 4. The more the 
financial soundness was improved, the greater the increase in the long-term SME 
loan. This result aligns with Aggarwal and Jacques' (2001) finding that the non-
performing loan ratio was a significant factor in loan change. 
Table 5 shows the results of the Sargan and Z tests for robustness. No bias 
was found in estimating the coefficients by using the GMM methodology. 
Table 5
Analytical results of effects of pro-cyclicality on long-term loans
Model 3
(Dependent Variable = ΔInvEi,t)
Model 4
(Dependent Variable = ΔInvRDi,t)
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4
Intercept -0.2016***
(-24.29)
-0.4826***
(-51.80)
-0.1423***
(-4.20)
-0.1488***
(-4.39)
(1) BizCyclet 0.4518***
(27.48)
0.6297***
(23.50)
0.3350***
(7.39)
0.3391***
(7.47)
(2) BISi,t -0.0018
(-0.21)
-0.0018
(-0.21)
-0.0018
(-0.21)
-0.0018
(-0.21)
(3) NIMi,t 0.0826**
(2.33)
0.0826**
(2.33)
0.0826**
(2.33)
0.0826**
(2.33)
(4) NPLi,t -0.0488***
(-2.87)
-0.0488***
(-2.87)
-0.0488***
(-2.87)
-0.0488***
(-2.87)
(5) Control (M)t Included Included Included Included
(6) Control (R)t Included Included Included Included
(7) Crisis_Dumt Excluded Included Excluded Included
Time_effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm_effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sargan_Test (χ2) 3.98 3.98 3.98 3.98
Notes: ** and *** means statistically significant at 5% and 1%, respectively. The hypothesis of the Sargan test 
is that there is no correlation between instrument variable and residual term, and it cannot be rejected. The 
hypothesis of the Z test that there is no autocorrelation in the residual term, and it cannot be rejected.
CONCLUSION
The current study was conducted to determine the pro-cyclicality of SME loans 
according the purpose of the loan. Previous studies found that the pro-cyclicality 
of SME loans was related to the business cycle because of the high credit risk and 
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asymmetrical information about SMEs. However, the results of the current study 
showed that SME loans are classified according to the loan period, and that the pro-
cyclicality of long-term and short-term SME loans differed. This study examined 
the lending behaviour of Korean banks since 2006 when the Basel II accord was 
implemented. The sample consisted of data were collected for the period 2006 to 
2014. The current study classified loan type according to the loan period based 
on the purpose of the loan. The advanced internal rating approach was used to 
examine the effect on the changes to SME loans, which was attributed to the high 
sensitivity to credit risk of SMEs. 
The main test results are follows. First, pro-cyclicality in total SME loans 
existed even though some steps were taken to mitigate it, such as new regulations 
about the implementation of capital buffers and the reinforcement of the loan-to-
deposit ratio recommended in the Basel III accord. Second, as expected, long-term 
SME loans also showed significant pro-cyclicality in relation to the business cycle. 
Thus, the advanced internal rating approach leads to high credit risk sensitivity; 
therefore, economic conditions and changes in SME loans are directly linked. 
Third, the pro-cyclicality of short-term loans for purchasing raw materials has 
been mitigated since the implementation of the Basel II accord. Contrary to total 
SME loans and long-term SME loans, the banks' lending behaviour with regard 
to short-term SMEs differed in terms of the linkage between economic conditions 
and changes in SME loans. Fourth, the bank characteristics of profitability and 
financial soundness affected loan change. In particular, the deterioration in financial 
soundness resulted in decreasing the number of both short-term and long-term 
SME loans. This evidence supports the research results of Aggarwal and Jacques 
(2001).
The lending behaviour of Korean banks has mitigated the pro-cyclicality 
of short-term loans. However, pro-cyclicality persists in long-term loans and total 
SME loans. The reason could be that the banks' lending behaviour with regard to 
SMEs differs according to the loan period, which could be attributed to differences 
in risk exposure and recovery rate according to default. Based on the results of this 
study, effective policies, such as credit enhancement through credit guarantees, are 
recommended to alleviate the effects pro-cyclicality on long-term loans.
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